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1 Introduction
Recent theoretical work studies the dynamic implication of informational externalities when
agents may adjust experimentation intensity continuously. Yet, there are many situations where
such an adjustment is not feasible or desirable. For instance, when different organizations choose
whether to adopt a new technology involving increasing returns or network externalities, a partial
adoption may be prohibitively costly. In this paper we study a game of strategic experimentation
where agents are restricted to an all or nothing sampling strategy. We investigate how the
outcome of strategic interaction and its welfare properties are affected by i) the size of the
samples that the agents may experiment on and ii) the features of the value of the information
generated through experimentation (its sensitivity to changes in sample size).
To illustrate our analysis, we focus more specifically on an example that is of particular
relevance: the drug approval decisions taken in different countries. No matter how stringent
and elaborate a drug approval procedure may be, there always remains some uncertainty about
the product’s effectiveness and its potential undesirable side effects when a government agency
decides whether to allow firms to introduce a new medicine in the market.1 For instance,
regarding post approval risks, Bakke et al. (1995) find that from 3% to 4% of newly approved
drugs in the US, the UK and Spain over the period 1974-1993 were discontinued for safety
reasons. According to a study by the US Accounting Office on a sample of drugs approved by
the FDA between 1976 and 1985, 51.5% of these drugs had serious post approval risk resulting in
labelling changes or withdrawal. If the drug is approved, its large scale use will help to settle part
of the remaining uncertainty. The authorization decision should therefore take into account, not
only the information generated by the approval process, but also the value of the information
that is generated by an extensive use of the new drug. Furthermore, if a new medicine is
introduced in one country, the information thus generated may be used by other countries in
making their approval decision. In other words, other countries benefit from an informational
externality. Finally, the drug approval decision is to a large extent a binary one. Once a drug is
marketed, it should be available for all those who have the specified health condition provided
they respect a certain set of rules. In real world situations the choice is not necessarily binary,
because the government agency may specify various marketing conditions that will make the
drug available for various sub-populations with different health conditions. However the choice
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remains a lump sum one.
New medicines are usually not approved simultaneously in all countries under identical mar-
keting conditions. According to Rawson (2000), only 10.5% of the drugs approved in one of five
countries from 1996 to 1998 were actually approved in all five (with almost half of them being
approved only in one).2 There are some obvious reasons for this, such as differences in approval
procedures or pharmaceutical companies’ strategies to file for approval in some countries first.
Here we focus on the incentive that some countries may have to adopt a waiting position in
order to benefit from an informational externality if the new drug is first approved elsewhere.
To this end, we take approval procedures and the laboratory’s strategy as given. Nevertheless
our analysis provides some insight as to what might influence the choice of a strategy by a drug
company. Finally note that our analysis is also relevant for situations where countries choose
how restrictive the marketing conditions of an approved drug should be.3
We consider a two period model in which each of two countries must independently decide
at each period whether to approve the introduction of a new medicine in its market. In decid-
ing whether to approve the medicine in the first period, each country takes into account the
expected benefit from introducing the drug given its prior information as well as the value of
the information generated once the drug has been introduced. The latter information is public,
so that if only one country chooses to approve the drug, the other country also benefits from
the additional information. It is valuable to both countries because the approval decision may
be reversed: in a second period a country may choose to withdraw the drug or introduce it,
based on what has been learned from the drug’s consumption in the first period. This option to
use first period information to reverse the approval decision in the second period creates a value
defined as the value of information. Countries only differ in terms of population size, and thus in
the size of the samples over which they may experiment: for each country, the experimentation
sample comprises the population of potential users of the drug in the country. They share the
same prior information and the same per capita benefit from introducing the drug. We consider
the case of costly experimentation where the common prior is such that the expected benefit of
introducing the drug is negative.
The strategic interaction between agents due to informational externalities is affected by the
sizes of the experimentation samples and the sensitivity of information to changes in sample
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sizes. We find that there is experimentation only if the total number of potential users of the
drug is sufficiently large. If this is the case, then there is always an equilibrium where the
larger country experiments. In particular, if the number of potential users of the drug is not
too large, this is the only equilibrium since the smaller country always finds it optimal to free
ride on the larger country’s experimentation. For larger populations of users, the equilibrium
outcome depends on the speed at which the marginal value of information from increases the
sample size decreases. If it decreases rapidly, then for a very large population of potential users,
countries face a coordination problem with two equilibria in which either country experiments
and the other free rides, whereas for a relatively smaller user population both would experiment
in equilibrium. If the marginal value of information decreases slowly then both countries will
experiment.
We compare the equilibrium outcome to a second best social welfare benchmark whereby the
social planner is also restricted to lump sum sampling: the social planner chooses between no ex-
perimentation, experimentation in either country or experimentation in both countries. Strategic
experimentation may be optimal, insufficient or excessive. The most striking conclusion of our
welfare analysis is clearly that restricting experimentation decisions to be lump sum may in-
duce excessive experimentation in equilibrium, which departs from the under-experimentation
result that is typically obtained when experimentation may be adjusted continuously. In the
present setting, over-experimentation arises in situations where only the larger country experi-
ments whereas it would have been socially optimal to experiment in the smaller country alone.
It is not necessarily associated with large samples. For intermediate sample sizes, a sufficient
condition for over-experimentation is that the value of information is not too elastic with respect
to the sample size and that sample sizes do not differ too much.
Previous work on strategic experimentation with informational externalities include Hen-
dricks and Kovenock (1989), Rob (1991), Bolton and Harris (1999) and Cripps, Keller and
Rady (2005). Our work is closest to the work of Hendricks and Kovenock (1989). In their two
period framework, players are restricted to an all or nothing experimentation decision, they
have identical experimentation sample sizes but they differ in their prior on the value of the
investment. In their setting, one experiment is sufficient to generate all the information, so that
a player would not experiment knowing for sure that the other does. The asymmetry in priors
induces a bayesian game where experimentation may be excessive or insufficient. Rob (1991)
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considers an entry game with a large population of identical players who learn about the prof-
itability of the market from previous entry. The entry decision is binary but since investments
are identical in size, it is not possible to observe the type of excessive experimentation that
we emphasize. Finally, Bolton and Harris (1999) and Cripps, Keller and Rady (2005) consider
continuous time settings with continuous experimentation decisions.4 They find that experi-
mentation is insufficient.5 This is analogous to standard results in public goods provision games
where costs are private and benefits are public. Using such a continuous time set up in our
lump sum experimentation problem would enrich the analysis by allowing for more elaborate
strategies in which the timing of drug approval would depend on the result of experimentation
by others.
We describe the model in the next section and provide some benchmark results on the social
optimum and the non cooperative outcome for continuous sampling. Section 3 characterizes the
outcome of the non cooperative strategic interaction when sample sizes are lump sum. Section
4 provides a welfare evaluation of the non cooperative outcome. The last section concludes.
2 The model
Consider two countries, small and large (M and L for short), who are contemplating au-
thorizing a new drug. However they cannot perfectly assess the benefits from introducing the
new medicine. We assume that the product review yields the same prior on the value of the
medicine. We take this prior as given and focus on the additional information that is generated
once the product is marketed, and on how this information may be used to re-evaluate a previous
decision. A country that had previously chosen to authorize may decide to withdraw while a
country that had initially denied approval may reverse its decision. We therefore consider a two
period framework. We say that a country experiments if it grants approval in the first period.
The per capita benefits over one period are measured by the per capita social surplus denoted
s which is the realization of a real valued random variable S defined over a set of states of nature
Ω. In the state of nature ω ∈ Ω, authorizing the new drug in one period is optimal if and only if
this surplus is positive. The value of S(ω) is a measure of per capita total welfare in state ω as
evaluated by the public authority. It is of course affected by the therapeutic characteristics and
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undesirable effects of the new medicine but also reflects the authority’s attitude towards risk,
political considerations, the functioning of the health care system, and so on.
The decision criterion for each country is the expected surplus: in a static setting, the
new medicine is approved if E(S) ≡ s¯ ≥ 0. This static viewpoint however does not allow
for taking into account staggered approval decisions or withdrawals of previously authorized
products based on the post-approval information. In our two period setup, each country must
independently decide whether or not to approve the new medicine in the first period. The
outcome of experimentation is publicly observed. In the second period, a country that approved
in the first period decides whether to confirm approval or withdraw the medicine, whereas
a country that did not approve in the first period decides whether to approve it (based on
the information generated by the first period experimentation if any). We concentrate on the
interesting case where s¯ < 0 so that experimentation is costly and the drug would not be
introduced in a static setting.
2.1 Second period analysis and the value of information
We first consider the second period decisions as a function of the information generated by first
period experimentation. This in turn will allow us to characterize the value of that information
as a function of the size of the experiment.
If at least one country experiments, all countries have the opportunity to observe the value
of a random variable Xn ≡ (X1, ..., Xn) that is related to the surplus S. The observation of
Xn provides some information about the value of S. The dimension n reflects the scale of the
experiment, which is related for instance to the size of the population concerned: the larger the
size of the countries or the number of countries where the drug is approved, the larger n is. A
higher dimension induces better quality information in a sense we define below. We assume that
the conditional distribution of Xn when S = s can be specified for each possible value s ∈ IR.
We denote p(./xn) (IR→ IR), the posterior density of S after an n-dimensional experiment
xn, fn(./s) (IRn → IR) the conditional density of Xn, and fn(.) (IRn → IR) the non conditional
density of Xn. We have
p(./xn) =
fn(xn/s)p(s)∫
IR f
n(xn/s)p(s)ds
.
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In period two, a country decides to extend approval or, if it had not approved the drug in
period one, to approve it, if and only if the posterior per capita expected surplus E(S/xn) is
positive. Without experimentation, the drug would not be approved in period 2 since s¯ < 0,
and thus per capita surplus would be zero. Thus per capita value of information generated by an
n-dimensional experiment equals the ex ante expected second period per capita surplus (prior
to observing Xn) given by
In ≡
∫
IRn
fn(xn)max{E(S/xn), 0}dxn.
The above expression measures the expected benefit from taking a decision after observing Xn
rather than deciding on the basis of prior beliefs on the new medicine.
Let us show that In is an increasing function of n.
In+1 =
∫
IRn+1
fn+1(xn+1)max{E(S/xn+1), 0}dxn+1
=
∫
IRn
fn(xn)
∫
IR
gn+1(xn+1/xn)max{E(S/xn, xn+1), 0}dxn+1dxn,
where gn+1(./xn) denotes the density of Xn+1 conditional on Xn = xn. Using the convexity
of the max function and Jensen’s inequality, we have In+1 ≥ In (where we use E(S/xn) =∫
IR gn+1(xn+1/x
n)E(S/xn, xn+1)dxn+1).
We henceforth assume that the size of the experiment only depends on the size of the
potential number of prescriptions in the geographic area where the drug is approved in the first
period. This size is now allowed to take any positive real value to simplify the exposition. Let
θ > 0 denote the size of the overall potential number of prescriptions (hereafter pnp) in both
countries. The country large is assumed to be the larger and its share in overall pnp is denoted
λ ∈ [1/2, 1]. If there is an experiment on a fraction λ of overall pnp, the per capita value of
information is then I(λθ). The value of the second period game for each country is thus given
by I(λθ) times the country’s pnp.
Specifying the prior distribution and the joint distribution of the signals generated by the
experimentation would allow for providing a closed form expression of the value of information.
We rather keep these distributions unspecified and make general assumptions that are consistent
with results in the literature. We assume that the marginal impact of increasing the sample
size on the per capita value of information is decreasing and tends to zero when the sample
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size becomes very large.6 This reflects the intuition that if the drug has been experimented
with on a large pnp, the incremental information that could be generated from increasing the
size of the experiment becomes rather limited.7 We finally assume that I is twice continuously
differentiable, with I ′(0) > −s¯ at zero. The degree to which the value of information is concave
turns out to be critical for the analysis. The relevant measure of concavity here is the elasticity
of the slope σ(x) = −xI ′′(x)/I ′(x). For x small, we have the following result (which is obviously
true if the second derivative of I has a finite limit at 0).8
Lemma 1 Since I(0) = 0, σ(x) < 1 for x sufficiently close to 0.
For larger values of x, σ may exceed one. To simplify the analysis we assume the following.
Assumption 1 If σ(x) > 1 for some x, then σ(x′) > 1 for all x′ > x.
If the returns to experimentation do not decrease too rapidly, then σ remains below one even for
very large population sizes. This would be the case for instance if I is given by a power function,
I(x) = xα, with 0 < α < 1 and thus σ(x) = 1 − α < 1 is constant. If on the contrary returns
to experimentation decrease rapidly, then σ eventually exceeds 1 as the sample size increases.
For instance, this happens for I(x) = 1 − e−αx with α > 0 and thus σ(x) = αx is linear and
increasing.
2.2 First period game
We now consider the first period game in which each country independently chooses whether to
authorize the drug for the current period. When a country experiments, it incurs the per capita
cost of experimentation given by the negative expected per capita surplus s¯. For each country,
the per capita payoff in the first period game is an intertemporal payoff: it is the sum of the per
capita cost of experimentation and the per capita value of information which is a function of the
size of the total first period experiment (we abstract from discounting to simplify notations, but
the value of information may be interpreted as a discounted second period expected surplus).
Strategies and payoffs may be summarized by the following matrix where large chooses a
line and small chooses a column:
7
e¯M eM
e¯L 0 0 λθI((1− λ)θ) (1− λ)θ(s¯+ I((1− λ)θ))
eL λθ(s¯+ I(λθ)) (1− λ)θI(λθ) λθ(s¯+ I(θ)) (1− λ)θ(s¯+ I(θ))
where ei and e¯i indicate experimentation and no experimentation by country i respectively,
i ∈ {L,M}.
Our objective is to derive the equilibrium of this game and study how it is affected by changes
in the overall pnp θ, and the share of the large country in this overall pnp, λ.
2.3 Continuous choice of sample sizes
Although, our main focus is the case where sample sizes are lump sum, we first present as a
benchmark what would happen if sample sizes could be chosen continuously. First consider
the social optimum. Suppose that for a given total pnp θ, it is possible to choose any sample
size γθ where we may pick γ ∈ [0, 1]. Overall surplus is given by γθs¯ + θI(γθ). From our
assumptions this overall surplus is a strictly concave function of γ which becomes decreasing for
γ large enough so that it is maximized for a unique γ∗. The derivative for γ = 0 is θs¯+ θ2I ′(0):
we obtain γ∗ = 0 if and only if θ ≤ −s/I ′(0). Otherwise we have γ∗ > 0 and the first order
condition is:
θs¯+ θ2I ′(γ∗θ) ≥ 0 (1)
with equality if γ∗ < 1.
We now consider the non cooperative solution where each country chooses its sample size
independently. Let γMθ and γLθ denote the sample sizes selected by small and large respec-
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tively. We must have γM ∈ [0, 1 − λ] and γL ∈ [0, λ]. When one country selects a sample size
γiθ, it pays a cost of γiθs¯. The benefit depends on both countries’ experimentation. The value
of information generated by an experimentation of size (γM + γL)θ is I((γM + γL)θ). Surpluses
are thus given by
λθI(γθ) + γLθs¯ for large, (2)
(1− λ)θI(γθ) + γMθs¯ for small (3)
where γ = γM + γL. Surplus derivatives are
λθ2I ′(γθ) + θs¯ for large (4)
(1− λ)θ2I ′(γθ) + θs¯ for small. (5)
Since λ > 1/2, (4) exceeds (5) so that, surplus derivatives cannot simultaneously be equal
to zero. This means that γM ∈ (0, 1− λ) and γL ∈ (0, λ) cannot be an equilibrium. Moreover,
if (5) is at least zero then (4) is strictly positive, which implies that if small is to experiment
at all then large experiments over its entire population. Otherwise the equilibrium outcomes
are no experimentation or experimentation by large alone.9 Observe that the derivative of
the overall surplus is strictly greater than (4). Thus in any equilibrium with experimentation,
condition (1) holds with strict inequality and equilibrium experimentation is insufficient unless
both countries experiment on their entire population. This is because each country bears all the
costs of increasing its sample size but only receives part of the benefits.
In this paper we consider a situation where each country is restricted to experiment over
its entire sample size if it experiments at all. Although it is still true that a country privately
bears the cost of experimentation while benefits are public, the restriction to an all or nothing
decision may lead to over-experimentation that would not arise with a continuous choice of
experimentation.
3 Strategic interaction
We first derive the Nash equilibria of the game as a function of overall pnp, θ and large’s share
in the overall pnp, λ. Let us characterize large’s best response as a function of parameter
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values. If small does not experiment then it is optimal for large to experiment if and only if
I(λθ) ≥ −s¯. (6)
From Equation (6) and since I is strictly increasing we may define
θˆ(λ) =
I−1(−s¯)
λ
, (7)
which is the smallest potential number of prescriptions such that large would choose to exper-
iment alone. Similarly, the smallest pnp such that small would choose to experiment alone is
θˆ(1− λ). Clearly, θˆ is strictly decreasing and strictly convex in λ and we have θˆ(λ) ≤ θˆ(1− λ).
If small experiments then large prefers joint experimentation over free riding if and only
if
J(λ, θ) ≡ s¯+ I(θ)− I((1− λ)θ) ≥ 0. (8)
We have the following result.
Lemma 2 Under Assumption 1, for any λ ∈ (0, 1), the benefit from joint experimentation given
by J(λ, θ) is quasiconcave in θ and it is strictly increasing for θ low enough.
If both λ and θ are large enough, then the benefit from joint experimentation over free riding
for the large country is necessarily strictly positive. There is however no guarantee that a large
overall pnp would make this benefit strictly positive if the two countries are close in size (λ close
to 1/2).
Because our analysis focuses on experimentation behavior, we assume that its value is suffi-
ciently high relative to its cost −s¯ so that for any λ ∈ [1/2, 1], there exist some values of θ such
that joint experimentation is strictly preferred to free riding by the large country. From Lemma
2, the set of such θ is an open interval which we denote (θ(λ), θ¯(λ)), where the bounds set the
left-hand side of (8) to zero. The left-hand side of (8) is increasing in θ at θ and decreasing in θ
at θ¯. Since it is also strictly increasing in λ, the bounds θ and θ¯ are respectively decreasing and
increasing functions of λ. Note that we do not rule out the possibility that θ¯(λ) be infinite, a
situation which could arise when returns to experimentation do not decrease too quickly, so that
even when countries are very large, each of them prefers joint experimentation to free riding. In
particular this happens if σ < 1 throughout.
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Finally, since marginal returns to experimentation are decreasing, the added benefits from
experimenting in one country are less if the other country is also experimenting than if it is not.
The left-hand side of (6) is therefore larger than J(λ, θ). This in turn implies that for any λ,
the smallest overall pnp for which large is ready to experiment alone is less than the smallest
overall pnp for which it prefers joint experimentation to free-riding, θˆ(λ) < θ(λ).
Note that free riding is preferred to joint experimentation either because overall population
is too small (θ < θ) or too large (θ > θ¯): in the first case, the incremental benefit from joint
experimentation is too small because the country doing this additional experimentation is
too small ; in the second case, these benefits are too small because the other country is so
large that returns to additional experimentation are very low (this arises only when returns to
experimentation decrease sufficiently fast).
Insert Figure 1.
The equilibrium may then be summarized as shown in Figure 1. The figure depicts θˆ(λ),
θ(λ) and θ¯(λ) (with thick lines) which are used to determine the large country’s behavior.
When θ < θˆ(λ), not experimenting is a dominant strategy for large. When θ ∈ [θˆ(λ), θ(λ)]
or θ > θ¯(λ), experimentation is optimal for large if and only if small does not experiment.
Finally, if θ ∈ [θ(λ), θ¯(λ)], experimentation is a dominant strategy for large. We complete the
picture by drawing θˆ(1−λ), θ(1−λ) and θ¯(1−λ) (with thin lines) which are used to determine
the small country’s behavior. These curves are extensions of the large country’s curves (θˆ(λ),
θ(λ) and θ¯(λ) for λ < 1/2, tipped upside down because the argument is 1−λ instead of λ. These
curves may be used to identify regions where either experimentation or no experimentation is
a dominant strategy for small and regions where small experiments if and only if large
does not experiment. For each parameter region, the figure indicates the equilibrium strategy
profiles.10
In our discussion of the equilibrium outcome, we first concentrate on the case where returns
to experimentation do not decrease too rapidly, so that θ¯ is infinite (the two curves θ¯(λ) and
θ¯(1− λ) should then be ignored on the figure). Then for a low overall pnp size (θ < θˆ(λ)), not
experimenting is a dominant strategy for both countries : we obtain that the unique equilibrium
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involves no experimentation. If, on the contrary, overall user population is sufficiently large
(θ > θ(1−λ)), then experimentation is a dominant strategy and both countries experiment. For
intermediate values of θ, there is always an equilibrium in which large experiments alone. It is
the unique equilibrium when, either experimenting is a dominant strategy for large, (θ > θ(λ))
or, not experimenting is a dominant strategy for small (θ < θˆ(1 − λ)). In particular, the
first condition always holds if populations are sufficiently dissymmetric in size (for λ large). In
contrast, if pnp sizes are sufficiently close (λ close to 1/2), then there is a parameter region where
θˆ(1− λ) < θ < θ(λ), and each country prefers experimentation if and only if the other country
does not experiment. There are then two pure strategy equilibria, each involving experimentation
by one of the two countries.
If returns to experimentation decrease sufficiently fast so that θ¯ is finite, the outcome is
only modified for a large total pnp. Only one country experiments if the overall population is
so large that experimenting is no more a dominant strategy for small (θ > θ¯(1 − λ)). Then,
either experimenting is still a dominant strategy for large (θ < θ¯(λ)) and the equilibrium
is unique with large experimenting, or experimenting is no more a dominant strategy for
large (θ > θ¯(λ)) and there are two equilibria with either country experimenting. The following
proposition summarizes the main features of the equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 1 There always exists an equilibrium in pure strategy and we have the following.
1. If θ is small enough (θ < θˆ(λ)) there is no experimentation.
2. If θ ≥ θˆ(λ), there always exists an equilibrium where large experiments.
3. There is joint experimentation either for large user populations (θ > θ(λ)) if I is not too
concave or for intermediate user populations (θ(1 − λ) < θ < θ¯(1 − λ)) if I is concave
enough.
4. The game is a coordination game where either country experiments in equilibrium if coun-
tries are similar in size and user populations are not too large (λ close to 1/2 and
θˆ(1 − λ) < θ < θ(λ)) or if user populations are very large (θ > θ¯(λ)) and I is very
concave.
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Our results show that if there is experimentation then it is likely that the larger country is
experimenting. The only cases where small should be expected to be experimenting alone are
either when the population of potential users is not too large and country sizes are similar enough
or when the population of potential users is very large and marginal returns to experimentation
decrease sufficiently quickly. Finally, a large population of potential users does not necessarily
imply that both countries experiment: this is the case only if marginal returns to experimentation
do not decrease too fast.
4 Welfare
In this section we compare the outcome of non-cooperative strategic interaction with some
social welfare benchmarks. As we pointed out at the end of section 2, if sample sizes could be
chosen continuously then strategic interaction would typically result in under experimentation
and experimentation would never be excessive relative to the first-best benchmark.
In our welfare analysis of lump sum sampling, we adopt a second-best approach, whereby
the only options available to the social planner are, no approval, approval in either country or
approval in both. It is straightforward to apply some standard externality arguments to compare
the equilibrium outcome and the second-best socially optimum solution. When a country chooses
or not to experiment, it bears all of the additional costs but enjoys only part of the extra benefits.
The following results are immediate consequences of this simple reasoning.
1. If a country weakly prefers experimenting alone to no experimentation then experimenting
in this country is strictly socially preferable to no experimentation.
2. If a country weakly prefers joint experimentation to free-riding then joint experimentation
is strictly socially preferable to experimenting in the other country alone.
Strategic interaction may result in too little experimentation, the right level of experimen-
tation or excessive experimentation. We now explore these three possibilities.
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4.1 Too little experimentation
It is not too surprising that the simple externality arguments used above allow us to identify
various regions where experimentation is insufficient. This is the case for instance when no
country experiments and θ is close to θˆ(λ) (experimenting in the large country would then be
preferable). This is also the case when only one country experiments and θ is slightly below
θ(1 − λ) or slightly above θ¯(1 − λ) (around the bell shaped area in the middle of the figure).
Then experimentation in both countries would be preferable since both countries “nearly” prefer
joint experimentation to free riding. Finally, under-experimentation is also possible when the
smaller country experiments alone (we will provide an example of this below, see endnote 11).
4.2 The right level of experimentation
It is also straightforward to identify parameter regions where experimentation is optimal. When
both countries experiment in equilibrium then it is clearly the second-best social optimum.
Experimentation is a dominant strategy for both countries, which implies that experimenting in
both dominates all other options. Obviously experimentation is also optimal if λ is close to 1,
since large then internalizes all costs and benefits. From the analysis with continuous sampling
in Section 2, we also know that if the total number of users is sufficiently small, and I ′(0) is finite,
no experimentation is optimal (and it is also the equilibrium outcome). Finally, when marginal
returns to experimentation decrease sufficiently fast so that σ becomes less than 1, it is possible
that for θ very large one of the two equilibria is optimal. For instance, for I(θ) = 1−e−θ, we have
γ∗ = − ln(−s¯/θ)/θ which tends to zero as θ goes to infinity, so that the equilibrium where small
experiments yields the second-best optimum (when small experiments, no experimentation is
socially dominated so that there is no over-experimentation). Our analysis below will show
that optimal experimentation is also possible in the other region with multiple equilibria, where
country sizes are intermediate (for θˆ(1− λ) < θ < θ(λ)).
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4.3 Excessive experimentation
It would be fairly straightforward to establish an over-experimentation result if the equilibrium
outcome were compared to a first-best benchmark where sample size is adjusted continuously:
then the first-best optimum may prescribe experimentation over a small fraction of the overall
pnp so that if large experiments in equilibrium, with λ close to 1, experimentation is excessive.
But it is somewhat less obvious that it can happen relative to our second best benchmark. Some
of our previous results may be used to establish necessary conditions for excessive experimenta-
tion. We have seen that when both countries experiment, it is a socially optimal outcome and
also that experimentation by small in equilibrium implies that no experimentation is socially
dominated. Hence, there is over-experimentation only in an equilibrium where the large country
experiments alone. Since experimentation by large implies that no experimentation is socially
dominated, there is over-experimentation only if large experiments and the social optimum
prescribes that only small experiments.
The analysis with continuous sampling provides some additional insight by considering how
the first best socially optimal sample size γ∗ relates to 1 − λ. Overall surplus being strictly
concave in γ, a sufficient condition for over-experimentation when large experiments alone is
that (1 − λ) > γ∗. This condition guarantees that the second best social optimum involves
experimentation in the small country alone.
Intuition suggests that the potential for over-experimentation would be largest for large user
populations. It turns out that this depends upon how concave the value of information is. In
particular, if σ < 1, there is optimal experimentation when θ is large (in this case, there is joint
experimentation in equilibrium). As the following proposition shows, over-experimentation for
large user populations does happen if returns to experimentation decrease sufficiently quickly.
More strikingly, it also shows that over-experimentation may occur even if overall pnp is not
very large.
Proposition 2 Sufficient conditions for over-experimentation in equilibrium are:
1. Overall pnp θ is sufficiently large and γ∗ tends to zero as θ tends to infinity;
2. Overall pnp θ is sufficiently close to θˆ with θ > θˆ and the value of information is not too
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elastic with respect to the sample size:
ε ≡ xI
′(x)
I(x)
< 1− λ ∀ x ≥ 0.
The first item corresponds to a situation where, as overall pnp becomes sufficiently large, the
first-best optimum, γ∗, falls below the smaller pnp, 1−λ. When the value of information is very
concave so that σ becomes larger than 1 for θ large, then standard comparative statics shows
that γ∗ necessarily falls when the overall pnp is large. From equation (1) we have dγ∗/dθ =
γ∗/θ(σ(γ∗θ)−1 − 1). The possibility that γ∗ tends to zero as θ tends to infinity is illustrated by
the example used in the discussion of optimal experimentation where I(θ) = 1−e−θ. For θ large
enough, since γ∗ tends to zero, experimentation by large is excessive while the equilibrium
with only small experimenting yields socially optimal experimentation. To discuss the second
part of the proposition it is useful to consider an isoelastic value of information I(θ) = θε. Here
γ∗ is always increasing with θ since σ = 1 − ε < 1 so that there is never over-experimentation
with a large overall user population. However, if ε < 1/2, Proposition 2 tells us that there
is over-experimentation in equilibrium if the two countries are sufficiently close in size so that
ε < 1 − λ.11 If the difference between the two countries is indeed small, then the extent of
over-experimentation is limited. However, if the value of information is very inelastic, then
Proposition 2 applies even if a large share of the overall pnp is in the large country, so that the
excess in experimentation is significant.
5 Concluding remarks
We have investigated the consequences of restricting agents to lump sum sampling in a strategic
experimentation context. Our results show that if there is experimentation, it is likely that the
larger agent is experimenting and we should observe that small agents free ride on large ones.
If each agent could select a sample size, we would have a standard private provision of public
good problem where strategic interaction typically leads to under-experimentation. Instead, we
find that there may be over-experimentation as compared to a second-best welfare benchmark
in situations where the larger agent experiments alone whereas it would be optimal that the
smaller agent experiments alone. In particular, over experimentation may arise even if sample
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sizes are not very large provided that returns to experimentation are not too sensitive to changes
in the size of the experimentation.
In our analysis of drug approval decisions, we have ignored the strategic behavior of private
agents such as patients, physicians or firms.12 In particular, we have assumed that a pharma-
ceutical company seeks approval simultaneously in both countries whereas it may choose to seek
approval in different countries sequentially. In this case, it is clear that it would prefer to ask
for approval in large countries first. Furthermore, if the drug is expected to be approved in all
countries, then there is no point for the firm not to seek approval simultaneously. Thus our
predictions on the outcome of strategic interaction would not be affected apart from cases where
there is an equilibrium with the small country experimenting alone. In that case, the sequential
choice by the firm selects the equilibrium where the large country experiments. These conclu-
sions on pharmaceutical firms’ behavior should be taken with care since it does not account for
long run interactions between drug approval decisions and research and development strategies
in the pharmaceutical industry.
Two comments are in order regarding the relationship of our results to those in the litera-
ture on overprovision of public goods. First, it is rather straightforward to construct a game
matrix representing a public good provision problem with lump sum actions where the outcome
involves overprovision. This is the point made by Buchanan and Kafoglis (1963) in their re-
ciprocal example. Our contribution is to derive general conditions in the context of strategic
experimentation under which such a game matrix may arise. These conditions pertain to under-
lying parameters such as sample sizes and to the properties of the benefits from experimentation.
Previous literature has also pointed out that overprovision results could be obtained only with
some non convexities in underlying preferences or technologies (see Diamond and Mirrlees, 1973,
for instance). Potential application of our model to the adoption of new technologies exhibiting
increasing returns or network externalities provide instances of such non convexities yielding
overprovision of a public good. An illustration of this is provided by the introduction of new
surgical procedures in hospitals (see the study by Escarce (1996) on the adoption of laparo-
scopic cholecystectomy). Then if the two technologies are used together, the organization must
incur two fixed costs and therefore, if it decides to switch, it would do it for the whole activity.
This may result in over experimentation if the new technology could have been introduced in
a somewhat smaller organization. The large organization could not replicate the same level of
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experimentation without incurring both fixed costs. It may also be costly for an organization
to introduce a new technology with network externalities. Think for instance of adopting a new
computer operation system or a new management software. Then the adoption decision is clearly
a binary one and it may be the case that the technology is introduced in a large organization
whereas it would have been optimal to introduce it in a smaller one where the cost of potential
disruptions would have been less severe.
One limitation of our analysis is that it is inherently static because the timing of decisions
such as continuation, withdrawal or introduction in the example of drug approval decisions is
exogenous. In practice, such decisions could be taken at any time once some experimentation
has been carried out. Future research should be devoted to embedding the lump sum exper-
imentation problem analyzed in the present paper in a dynamic setting that could provide
predictions as to the timing of the agents reactions to the results of experimentation given that
those reactions are restricted to being lump sum jumps.
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Notes
1 The current regulation of new drugs demands arbitrary amounts of information. As a
result, Claxton (1998) shows that existing drug approval procedures do not convey sufficient
information about the product’s effectiveness.
2 The five countries were the Australia, Canada, Sweden, UK and the US.
3For instance, the appetite suppressant molecule Dexfenfluramine which was approved by
the FDA in 1996 had been in use in Europe for a decade under very stringent conditions. The
widespread use of the drug in the US and Canada after 1996 generated enough information
about the risk of primary pulmonary hypertension to prompt a quick removal of the drug in
all countries after 1997. The FDA’s 1996 decision clearly generated a significant informational
externality for European countries.
4Other references on similar settings include De´camps and Mariotti (2004) or Malueg and
Tsutsui (1997).
5Although Bolton and Haris (1999) stress that dynamic strategic interaction tends to
exacerbate the incentives to experiment, this effect is never strong enough to yield over-
experimentation.
6This assumption applies to the per capita value of information and it may well be the case
that the marginal impact of increasing the pnp on the total value of information is increasing.
7Radner and Stiglitz (1984) have pointed out a nonconcavity problem in the value of in-
formation: they present examples in which information exhibits increasing marginal returns,
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so the value of information is clearly not always concave. This nonconcavity result has been
recently extended by Chade and Schlee (2002). They show that if the nonconcavity is difficult
to rule out in a general model, it is always possible to construct examples that yield a concave
value of information. In particular, if we measure the quantity of information by the number
of independent observations from an experiment (as it is the case in our model), Moscarini and
Smith (2002) show that the marginal value of information falls as the number of observations
increases for a large enough sample size.
8Proofs are available upon request.
9The analysis here is similar to that of a public good contribution game with quasilinear
preferences where there would be upper bounds on individual contributions.
10There is no situation with an equilibrium where both experiment along with an equilibrium
where neither experiments. This is due to the decreasing marginal return to experimentation
which rules out a situation where it would be optimal for one country to systematically mimic
the other one. This property also guarantees the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium.
11 The argument in the proof of Proposition 2 may easily be adapted, reversing the inequalities,
to show that the elasticity of I being larger than one half is a sufficient condition for insufficient
experimentation with small experimenting in equilibrium.
12The extent of experimentation in a country that chooses to approve the drug may depend
on how patients and physicians behave if they realize that the newly approved medicine yields
negative surplus. If private costs are similar to public costs, strategic behavior by users would
exacerbate under-experimentation. Because of health insurance, private costs are somewhat
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smaller than public costs and we should then expect massive under experimentation. The
difference between public and private costs may also be important if costs are mostly production
costs and the negative expected surplus is due to uncertainty about potential benefits. Then,
following approval, the drug might be used extensively even though its potential benefits are
limited in expectation. In such a situation our over-experimentation result would still hold.
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